Fides: Managing Data on Untrusted Infrastructure by Maiyya, Sujaya et al.
Fides: Managing Data on Untrusted Infrastructure
Sujaya Maiyya Danny Hyun Bum Cho Divyakant Agrawal Amr El Abbadi
UC Santa Barbara
{sujaya maiyya, hyunbumcho, divyagrawal, elabbadi}@ucsb.edu
ABSTRACT
Significant amounts of data are currently being stored and
managed on third-party servers. It is impractical for many
small scale enterprises to own their private datacenters,
hence renting third-party servers is a viable solution for such
businesses. But the increasing number of malicious attacks,
both internal and external, as well as buggy software on
third-party servers is causing clients to lose their trust in
these external infrastructures. While small enterprises can-
not avoid using external infrastructures, they need the right
set of protocols to manage their data on untrusted infras-
tructures. In this paper, we propose TFCommit , a novel
atomic commitment protocol that executes transactions on
data stored across multiple untrusted servers. To our knowl-
edge, TFCommit is the first atomic commitment protocol to
execute transactions in an untrusted environment without
using expensive Byzantine replication. Using TFCommit,
we propose an auditable data management system, Fides,
residing completely on untrustworthy infrastructure. As an
auditable system, Fides guarantees the detection of poten-
tially malicious failures occurring on untrusted servers us-
ing tamper-resistant logs with the support of cryptographic
techniques. The experimental evaluation demonstrates the
scalability and the relatively low overhead of our approach
that allows executing transactions on untrusted infrastruc-
ture.
1. INTRODUCTION
A fundamental problem in distributed data management
is to ensure the atomic and correct execution of transactions.
Any transaction that updates data stored across multiple
servers needs to be executed atomically, i.e., either all the
operations of the transaction are executed or none of them
are executed. This problem has been solved using commit-
ment protocols, such as Two Phase Commit (2PC) [17]. Tra-
ditionally, the infrastructure, and hence the servers storing
the data, were considered trustworthy. A standard assump-
tion was that if a server failed, it would simply crash; and
unless a server failed, it executed the designated protocol
correctly.
The recent advent of cloud computing and the rise of
blockchain systems are dramatically changing the trust as-
sumptions about the underlying infrastructure. In a cloud
environment, clients store their data on third-party servers,
located on one or more data centers, and they execute trans-
actions on the data. The servers hosted in the data cen-
ters are vulnerable to external attacks or software bugs that
can potentially expose a client’s critical data to a malign
agent (e.g., credit details exposed in Equifax data breach
[3], breaches to Amazon S3 buckets [1]). Further, a server
may intentionally decide not to follow the protocol execu-
tion, either to improve its performance or for any other self-
interest (e.g., the next big cyber threat is speculated to be
intentional data manipulation[2]).
The increasing popularity of blockchain is also exposing
the challenges of storing data on non-trustworthy infrastruc-
tures. Applications such as supply chain management [23]
execute transactions on data repositories maintained by
multiple administrative domains that mutually distrust each
other. Open permissionless blockchains such as Bitcoin [32]
use computationally expensive mining, whereas closed per-
missioned blockchains such as Hyperledger Fabric [7] use
byzantine consensus protocols to tolerate maliciously failing
servers. Blockchains resort to expensive protocols that tol-
erate malicious failures because for many applications, both
the underlying infrastructure and the participating entities
are untrusted.
The challenge of malicious untrustworthy infrastructure
has been extensively studied by the cryptographic and se-
curity communities (e.g., Pinocchio [35] that verifies out-
sourced computing) as well as in the distributed systems
community, originally introduced by Lamport in the famous
Byzantine Agreement Protocol [24]. One main motivation
for the protocol was to ensure continuous service availability
in Replicated State Machines even in the presence of mali-
cious failures.
In most existing databases, the prevalent approach to tol-
erate malicious failures is by replicating either the whole
database or the transaction manager [15, 16, 41, 47, 4].
Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT) [9] by Castro
and Liskov has become the predominant replication protocol
used in designing data management systems residing on un-
trusted or byzantine infrastructure. These systems provide
fault-tolerance in that the system makes progress in spite of
byzantine failures; the replication masks these failures and
ensures that non-faulty processes always observe correct and
reliable information. Fault tolerance is guaranteed only if at
most one third of the replicas are faulty [8].
In a relatively open and heterogeneous environment know-
ing the number of faulty servers – let alone placing a bound
on them – is unrealistic. In such settings, an alternate ap-
proach to tolerate malicious failures is fault-detection which
can be achieved using auditability. Fault detection imposes
no bound on the number of faulty servers – any server can
fail maliciously but the failures are always detected as they
are not masked from the correct servers; detection requires
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only one server to be correct at any given time. To guaran-
tee fault detection through audits, tamper-proof logs have
been proposed and widely used in systems such as PeerRe-
view [18] and CATS [44].
Motivated by the need to develop a fault-detection based
data management system, we make two major propositions
in this paper. First, we develop a data management system,
Fides1, consisting of untrusted servers that may suffer ar-
bitrary failures in all the layers of a typical database, i.e.,
the transaction execution layer, the distributed atomic com-
mitment layer, and the datastore layer. Second, we propose
a novel atomic commit protocol –TrustFree Commitment
(TFCommit) – an integral component of Fides that commits
distributed transactions across untrusted servers while pro-
viding auditable guarantees. To our knowledge, TFCommit
is the first to solve the distributed atomic commitment prob-
lem in an untrusted infrastructure without using expensive
byzantine replication protocols. Although we present Fides
with TFCommit as an integral component, TFCommit can
be disintegrated from Fides and used in any other design of
a trust-free data management.
With detection being the focus rather than tolerance of
malicious failures, Fides precisely identifies the point in the
execution history at which a fault occurred, as well as the
servers that acted malicious. These guarantees provide two
fold benefits: i) A malicious fault by a database server
is eventually detected and undeniably linked to the mali-
cious server, and ii) A benign server can always defend itself
against falsified accusations. By providing auditabiity, Fides
incentivises a server not to act maliciously. Furthermore, by
designing a stand-alone commit protocol, TFCommit, that
leverages cryptography, we take the first step towards de-
veloping a full-fledged data management system that fully
resides in untrusted infrastructures. We believe it is critical
to start with a strong and solid atomic commitment building
block that can be expanded to include fault tolerance and
other components of a transaction management hierarchy.
Section 2 provides the necessary background used in devel-
oping a trust-free data management system. Section 3 dis-
cusses the architecture, system, and failure models of Fides.
Section 4 describes the auditable transaction model in Fides
and also introduces TFCommit. Section 5 provides a few
failure examples and their detection. Experimental evalu-
ation of TFCommit is presented in Section 6, followed by
related work in Section 7. Section 8 concludes the paper.
2. CRYPTOGRAPHIC PRELIMINARIES
Developing a data management system built on untrusted
infrastructure relies heavily on many cryptographic tools. In
this section, we provide the necessary cryptographic tech-
niques used throughout the paper.
2.1 Digital Signatures
A digital signature, similar to an actual signature, au-
thenticates messages. A public-key signature [37] consists
of a public key, pk, which is known to all participants, and
a secret key, sk, known only to the message author. The
author, A, signs message m using her secret key sk. Given
the message m and the signature, any receiver can verify
whether the author A sent the message m by decrypting
the signature using A’s public key pk. Public-key signature
1Fides is the Roman Goddess of trust and good faith.
Figure 1: Collective Signing.
schemes are used to prevent forgery as it is computationally
infeasible for author B to sign a message with author A’s
signature.
2.2 Collective Signing
Multisignature (multisig) is a form of digital signature
that allows more than one user to sign a single record. Mul-
tisigs, such as Schnorr Multisignature [38], provide addi-
tional authenticity and security compared with single user’s
signature. Collective Signing (CoSi) [40], an optimization
of Schnorr Multisigs, allows a leader to produce a record
which then can be publicly validated and signed by a group
of witnesses. CoSi requires two rounds of communication
to produce a collective signature (co-sign) with the size and
verification cost of a single signature. Figure 1 represents
the phases of CoSi where L is the leader and 1, 2, .., N are
the witnesses. The phases of CoSi are:
Announcement: The leader announces the beginning of
a new round to all the witnesses and sends the record R to
be collectively signed.
Commitment: Each witness, in response, picks a ran-
dom secret, which is used to compute the Schnorr commit-
ment, xsch. The witness then sends the commitment to the
leader.
Challenge: The leader aggregates all the commits, X =∑
xsch and computes a Schnorr challenge, ch = hash(X|R).
The leader then broadcasts the challenge to all the witnesses.
Response: Each witness validates the record before com-
puting a Schnorr-response, rsch, using the challenge and its
secret key. The leader collects and aggregates all the re-
sponses to finally produce a Schnorr multisignature.
The collective signature provides a proof that the record
is produced by the leader and that all the witnesses signed
it only after a successful validation. Anyone with the public
keys of all the involved servers can verify the co-sign and
the verification cost is the same as verifying a single signa-
ture. An invalid record will not produce enough responses to
prove the authenticity of the record. We refer to the original
work [40] for a detailed discussion of the protocol.
2.3 Merkle Hash Tree
Figure 2: Merkle Hash Tree example.
A merkle hash tree (MHT) [29] is a binary tree with each
leaf node labeled with the hash of a data item and each in-
ternal node labeled with the hash of the concatenated labels
of its children. Figure 2 shows an example of a MHT. The
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hash functions, h, used in MHTs are one way hash functions
i.e., for a given input x, h(x) = y, such that, given y and h,
it is computationally infeasible to obtain x. The hash func-
tion h must also be collision-free, i.e., it is highly unlikely to
have two distinct inputs x and z that satisfies h(x) = h(z).
Any such hash function can be used to construct a MHT.
Data Authentication Using MHTs: MHTs are used
to authenticate a set of data values [29] by requiring the
prover, say Alice, to publicly share the root of the MHT,
hroot, whose leave form the data set. To authenticate a
single data value, all that a verifier, say Bob, needs from
Alice is a Verification Object (VO) consisting of all the sib-
ling nodes along the path from the data value to the root.
The highlighted nodes in Figure 2 form the verification ob-
ject for data item a, VO(a), which is of size log2 n. To
authenticate data item a, Alice generates the VO(a), and
provides the value of a and VO(a) to Bob. Given the value
of a, Bob computes h(a) and uses hb from VO(a) to com-
pute ha,b = h(h(a)|h(b)) i.e., the hash of h(a) concatenated
with h(b). Finally, using ha,b and hc,d sent in the VO(a),
Bob computes the root, ha,b,c,d = (ha,b|hc,d). Bob then
compares the computed root, ha,b,c,d, with the root pub-
licly shared by Alice hroot. Assuming the use of a collision
free hash function (h(a1) 6= h(a2) where a1 6= a2), it would
be computationally infeasible for Alice to tamper with a’s
value such that the hroot published by Alice matches the
root computed by Bob using the verification object.
3. FIDES ARCHITECTURE
Fides is a data management system built on untrusted
infrastructure. This section lays the premise for Fides by
presenting the system model, the failure model, and the au-
dit mechanism of Fides.
3.1 System Model
Fides is a distributed database of multiple servers; the
data is partitioned into multiple shards and distributed on
these servers (perhaps provisioned by different providers).
Shards consist of a set of data items, each with a unique
identifier. The system assumes neither the servers nor the
clients to be trustworthy and can behave arbitrarily. Servers
and clients are uniquely identifiable using their public keys
and are aware of all the other servers in the system. All mes-
sage exchanges (client-server or server-server) are digitally
signed by the sender and verified by the receiver.
The clients interact with the data via transactions con-
sisting of read and write operations. The data can be ei-
ther single-versioned or multi-versioned with each commit-
ted transaction generating a new version. Every data item
has an associated read timestamp rts and a write times-
tamp wts, indicating the timestamp of the last transaction
that read and wrote the item, respectively. When a trans-
action commits, it updates the timestamps of the accessed
data items.
We choose a simplified design for a database server to
minimize the potential for failure. As indicated in Figure 3,
each database server is composed of four components: an
execution layer to perform transactional reads and writes; a
commitment layer to atomically (i.e., all servers either com-
mit or abort a transaction) terminate transactions; a data-
store where the data shards are stored; and a tamper-proof
log.
Figure 3: Components of a database server.
As individual servers are not trusted, we replace the lo-
cal transaction logs used in traditional protocols such as
Aries [30] with a globally replicated tamper-proof log (this
approach is inspired by blockchain). The log – a linked-list
of transaction blocks linked using cryptographic hash point-
ers – guarantees immutability. Global replication of the log
guarantees that even if a subset (but not all) of the servers
collude to tamper the log, the transaction history is persis-
tent.
3.2 Failure model
In Fides, a server that fails maliciously can behave arbi-
trarily i.e., send arbitrary messages, drop messages, or cor-
rupt the data it stores. Fides assumes that each server and
client is computationally bounded and is incapable of vio-
lating any cryptographic primitives such as forging digital
signatures or breaking one-way hash functions – the opera-
tions that typically require brute force techniques.
Let n be the total number of servers and f the maximum
number of faulty servers. Fides tolerates up to n− 1 faulty
servers, i.e., n > f . To detect failures, Fides requires at least
one server to be correct and failure-free (free of malicious,
crash, or network partition failures) at a given time. This
implies that the correct set of servers are not static and can
vary over time. This failure model is motivated by Dolev
and Strong’s [11] protocol where the unforgeability of digital
signatures allows tolerating up to n-1 failures rather than at
most 1
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n malicious failures without digital signatures.
An individual server, comprising of four components as
shown in Figure 3, can fail at one or more of the compo-
nents. A fault in the execution layer can return incorrect
values; in the commit layer can violate transaction atomic-
ity; in the datastore can corrupt the stored data values; and
in the log can omit or reorder the transaction history. We
discuss these faults in depth in Section 4. These failures can
be intentional (to gain application level benefits) or unin-
tentional (due to software bugs or external attacks); Fides
does not distinguish between the two.
A malicious client in Fides can send arbitrary messages or
semantically incorrect transactions to a database server but
later blame the server for updating the database inconsis-
tently. To circumvent this, the servers store all digitally
signed, unforgeable messages exchanged with the client.
This message log serves as a proof against a falsified blame
or when a client’s transaction sends the database to a se-
mantically inconsistent state.
3.3 Auditing Fides
Auditability has played a key role in building dependable
distributed systems [42, 43, 18]. Fides provides auditablil-
ity: the application layer or an external auditor can audit
3
Figure 4: Client interactions in Fides
individual servers with an intent to either detect failures or
verify correct behavior.
Fides guarantees that any failure, as discussed in Sec-
tion 3.2, will be detected in an offline audit. Fides focuses
on failure detection rather than prevention; detection in-
cludes identifying (i) the precise point in transaction his-
tory where an anomaly occurred, and (ii) the exact misbe-
having server(s) that is irrefutably linked to a failure.
The auditor is considered to be a powerful external entity
and during each audit:
(i) The auditor gathers the tamper-proof logs from all the
servers before the auditing process.
(ii) Given that at least one server is correct, from the
set of logs collected from all servers, the auditor identifies
the correct and complete log (how is explained in detail in
Section 4.4). The auditor uses this log to audit the servers.
Optimizations such as checkpointing [22] can be used to
minimize the log storage space at each server; these opti-
mizations are orthogonal and hence not discussed further.
If the audit uncovers any malicious activity, a practical so-
lution can be to penalize the misbehaving server in legal,
monetary, or other forms specific to the application. This
discourages a server from acting maliciously.
4. FIDES
In this section we present Fides: an auditable data man-
agement system built on untrusted infrastructure. The basic
idea is to integrate crypotographic techniques such as digi-
tal signatures (public and private key encryption), collective
signing, and Merkle Hash Trees (MHT) with the basic trans-
action execution in database systems. This integration re-
sults in verifiable transaction executions in an environment
where the database servers cannot be trusted.
4.1 Overview
Figure 4 illustrates the overall design of Fides. The clients
read and write relevant data by directly interacting with
the appropriate database partition server (this can be ac-
complished by linking the client application with a run-time
library that provides a lookup and directory service for the
database partitions). The architecture intentionally avoids
the layer of front-end database servers (e.g., Transaction
Managers) to coordinate the execution of transaction reads
and writes as these front-end servers may themselves be vul-
nerable and exhibit malicious behavior by relaying incorrect
reads/writes. Hence, in Fides all data-accesses are managed
directly between the client and the relevant database server.
Since data-accesses are handled with minimal synchro-
nization among concurrent activities, the burden of ensuring
the correct execution of transactions occurs when a trans-
action is terminated. We use a simplified setup where one
Figure 5: Transaction life-cycle in Fides
designated server acts as the transaction coordinator respon-
sible for terminating all transactions. The coordinator is
also an untrusted database server that has additional re-
sponsibilities only during the termination phase.
When a client application decides to terminate its trans-
action, it sends the termination request to the designated
coordinator; all other database servers act as cohorts dur-
ing the termination phase. For ease of exposition, we first
present a termination protocol executed globally involving
all database servers, irrespective of the shards accessed in
that transaction. The global execution implies transactions
are terminated sequentially. Later we relax this requirement
and allow different coordinators for concurrent transactions.
The following is an overview of the client-server interac-
tion: a typical life-cycle of a transaction as depicted in Fig-
ure 5.
1. Begin transaction: A client starts accessing the data
by first sending a Begin Transaction request to all the
database servers storing items read or written by the trans-
action.
2. Read-write request: The client then sends requests to
each server indicating the data items to be read and written.
3. Read-write response: The transaction execution layer
responds to a read request by fetching the data from the
datastore and relaying it to the client. The write requests
are buffered.
4. End Transaction: After completing data access, the
client sends End Transaction to the coordinator which co-
ordinates the commitment to ensure transaction correctness
(i.e., serializability) and transaction atomicity (i.e., all-or-
nothing property).
5. Atomic commitment: The coordinator and the co-
horts collectively execute the atomic commit protocol –
TFCommit– and decide either to commit or abort the trans-
action. The commitment produces a block (i.e., an entry in
the log) containing the transaction details. If the decision is
commit, then the next two steps are performed.
6. Add log: All servers append, to their local copy of the
log, the same block in a consistent order, thus creating a
globally replicated log.
7. Update datastore: The datastore is updated based on
the buffered writes, if any, along with updating the times-
tamps rts and wts of the data items accessed in the trans-
action.
8. Response: The coordinator responds to the client in-
forming whether the transaction was committed or aborted.
The log, stored as a linked-list of blocks, encompasses the
transaction details essential for auditing. It is vital to un-
derstand the structure of each block before delving deeper
into the transaction execution details. Every block stores
the information shown in Table 1. Although a block can
store multiple transactions, for ease of explanation, we as-
sume that only one transaction is stored per block.
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key description
TxnId commit timestamp of txn
R set list of 〈id : value, rts, wts〉
W set list of 〈id : new val, old val, rts, wts〉∑
roots MHT roots of shards
decision commit or abort
h hash of previous block
co-sign a collective signature of participants
Table 1: Details stored in each block
As indicated in Table 1, each transaction is identified by
its commit timestamp, assigned by the client that executed
this transaction. Any timestamp that supports total order-
ing can be used by the client – e.g., a Lamport clock with
〈client id : client time〉 – as long as all clients use the same
timestamp generating mechanism.
A block contains the transaction read and write sets con-
sisting of three vital pieces of information: 1) the data-item
identifiers that are read/written, 2) the values of items read
and the new values written; the old val in the write set is
populated only for blind writes, and 3) the latest read rts
and write wts timestamps of those data items at the time of
access (read or write).
The blocks also contain: the Merkle Hash Tree roots of
the shards involved in the transaction (explained more in
Section 4.2); the commit or abort transaction decision; the
hash of the previous block forming a chain of blocks linked
by their hashes; and finally, a collective signature of all the
servers (how and why are explained in Section 4.3).
The following subsections elaborate on the functionalities
of a database server in a transaction life cycle. For each
functionality, we first explain the correct behavior followed
by the techniques to detect malicious faults.
4.2 Transaction Execution
This section describes the correct mechanism for execut-
ing transactions (reads and writes) and discusses techniques
to detect deviations from the expected behavior.
Figure 6: Transaction execution in Fides
4.2.1 Correct Behavior
Figure 6 depicts the client-server interactions during
transaction execution. With regard to transaction execu-
tion, a correct database server is responsible for the follow-
ing actions: (i) return the values and timestamps of data-
items specified in the read requests, and (ii) buffer the values
of data-items updated in the transaction and if the trans-
action successfully commits, update the datastore based on
the buffered writes. We explain how a correct server achieves
these actions.
Reads and Writes: A client sends a begin transaction
message to all the database servers storing the items read or
written by the transaction. The client then sends a Read
request consisting of the data-item ids to the respective
servers. For example, if a transaction reads data item x
from server S1 and item y from server S2, the client sends
Read(x) to S1 and Read(y) to S2. The servers respond with
the data values along with the associated read rts and write
wts timestamps.
The client then sends the Write message with the data-
item ids and their updated values to the respective servers.
For example, if a transaction writes data item x in server S1
with value 5 and item y in server S2 with value 10, the client
sends Write(x,5) to S1 and Write(y,10) to S2. The servers
buffer these updates and respond with an acknowledgement.
To support blind writes, the acknowledgement includes the
old values and associated timestamps of the data-items that
are being written but were not read before.
After completing the data accesses, the client sends the
end transaction request – sent only to the designated co-
ordinator – consisting of the read and the write set: a list
of data item ids, the corresponding timestamps rts and wts
returned by the servers, and the values read and the new
values written. The coordinator then executes TFCommit
among all the servers to terminate (commit or abort) the
transaction (explained in detail in Section 4.3). If all the
involved servers decide to commit the transaction, each in-
volved server constructs a Merkle Hash Tree (MHT) (Sec-
tion 2.3) of its data shard with all the data items – with
updated values – as the leaves of the tree and with the root
node rootmht. The read and write sets and MHT roots be-
come part of the block in the log once the transaction is
committed.
Updating the datastore: If the transaction commits,
the servers involved in the transaction update the data val-
ues in their datastores based on the buffered writes. The
servers also update the read and write timestamps of the
data items accessed in the transaction to the transaction’s
commit timestamp.
The data can be single-versioned or multi-versioned. For
multi-versioned data, when a transaction commits, a cor-
rect server additionally creates a new version of the data
items accessed in the transaction while maintaining the older
versions. Although an application using Fides can choose
between single-versioned or multi-versioned data, multi-
versioned data can provide recoverability. If a failure oc-
curs, the data can be reset to the last sanitized version and
the application can resume execution from there.
4.2.2 Detecting Malicious Behavior
With regard to transaction execution, a server may mis-
behave by: (i) returning inconsistent values of data-items
specified in the read requests; and (ii) buffering incorrect
values of data-items updated in the transaction or updating
the datastore incorrectly.
(i) Incorrect Reads: All faults in Fides are detected by
an auditor during an audit. As mentioned in Section 3.3,
during an audit, the auditor collects the log from all servers
and constructs the correct and complete log.
To detect an incorrect read value returned by a malicious
server, the auditor must know the expected value of the
data-item. The read and write sets in each log entry con-
tains the information on the updated value of a written item
and the read value of a read item. Note that in our simpli-
fying assumption (which will be relaxed later), each block
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contains only one transaction and the transactions are com-
mitted sequentially with the log reflecting this sequential or-
der. By traversing the log, at each entry, the auditor knows
the most recent values of a given data item. We leverage
this to identify incorrectly returned values.
Lemma 1 : The auditor detects an incorrect value returned
for a data item by a malicious server.
Proof : Consider a transaction Ti that committed at
timestamp tsi and stored in the log at block bi. Assume
transaction Ti read an item x and updated it. Let bj be the
first block after bi to access the same data item x – where
j > i, indicating that transaction Tj in bj committed after
the transaction Ti in bi. The read value of x in bj must re-
flect the value written in bi; if the values differ, an anamoly
is detected. 2
(ii) Incorrect Writes: The effect of incorrectly buffer-
ing a write or incorrectly updating the datastore is the same:
the datastore ends up in an inconsistent state. The defini-
tion of incorrect datastore depends on the type of data: for
single versioned data, the latest state of data (data values
and timestamps) in the datastore is incorrect; for multi-
versioned data, one or more versions of the data are incor-
rect. We discuss techniques to detect incorrect datastore for
both types of data.
To detect an inconsistent datastore, we use the data au-
thentication technique proposed by Merkle [29] discussed in
Section 2.3. To use this technique, the auditor requires the
read and written values in each transaction and the resultant
Merkle Hash Tree (MHT) root – all pieces of information
stored within each block.
Multi-versioned data: For multi-versioned data, the au-
dit policy can involve auditing a single version chosen arbi-
trarily or exhaustively auditing all versions starting from
either the first version (block 0) or the latest version. We
explain auditing a single version, which can easily be ex-
tended to exhaustively auditing all versions.
Let Ti be a transaction committed at timestamp ts that
read and wrote data item x stored in server Sk. Assume
the auditor audits server Sk at version ts. Once the auditor
notifies the server about the audit, the server constructs the
Merkle Hash Tree with the data at version ts as the leaves;
Sk then shares the Verification Object VO– consisting of all
the sibling nodes along the path from the data x to the root
– with the auditor.
The log entry corresponding to transaction Ti stores the
value read for item x and the new value written. The auditor
uses (i) the VO sent by Sk, and (ii) the hash of x’s value
stored in the write set of the log, to compute the expected
MHT root for the data in Sk (discussed in Section 2.3).
The auditor then compares the computed root with the one
stored in the log. A mismatch indicates that the data at
version ts is incorrect.
Single-versioned data: For single versioned data, the
correctness is only with respect to the latest state of the
data. Hence, rather than using an arbitrary block to obtain
the MHT root of server Sk, the auditor uses the latest block
in the log that accessed the data in Sk to obtain the latest
MHT root. The other steps are similar to multi-versioned
data: the auditor fetches the VO based on the latest state
of Sk and recomputes the MHT root to compare the root
stored in the log.
Lemma 2 : The auditor detects an inconsistent datastore.
For multi-versioned data, the auditor detects the precise ver-
sion at which the datastore became inconsistent.
Proof : Detection is guaranteed since Merkle Hash Trees
(MHT) use collision-free hash functions (i.e., h(x) 6= h(y)
where x 6= y), and a malicious server cannot update a data
value such that the MHT root stored in the block matches
the root computed by the auditor using the verification ob-
ject sent by the server. For multi-versioned datastores, the
auditor identifies the precise version at which data corrup-
tion occurred by systematically authenticating all blocks in
the log until a version with mismatching MHT roots is de-
tected. 2
4.3 Transaction Commitment
This section describes how transactions are terminated in
Fides and presents a novel distributed atomic commitment
protocol – TrustFree Commit (TFCommit) – that handles
malicious failures. This section also discusses techniques to
detect failures if a server deviates from the expected be-
havior. With regard to transaction commitment, a correct
database server is responsible for the following actions: (i)
Ensure transaction isolation (i.e., strict serializability); (ii)
Ensure atomicity – either all servers commit the transac-
tion or no servers commit the transaction; and (iii) Ensure
verifiable atomicity.
4.3.1 Correct Behavior
Transaction Isolation : Transaction isolation deter-
mines how the impact of one transaction is perceived by the
other transactions. In Fides, even though multiple trans-
actions can execute concurrently, Fides provides serializable
executions in which concurrent transactions seem to execute
in sequence. To do so, servers in Fides abort a transaction if
it cannot be serialized with already committed transactions
in the log. The read rts and write wts timestamps associated
with each data item is used to detect non-serializable trans-
actions. The latest timestamps can be obtained from either
the datastore or the transaction log. Similar to timestamp
based optimistic concurrency control mechanism, at commit
time, a server checks if the data accessed in the terminating
transaction has been updated since they were read. If yes,
the server chooses to abort the transaction.
Atomicity and Verifiablity: Consider a traditional
atomic commit protocol that provides atomicity: Two Phase
Commit (2PC) [17]. 2PC guarantees atomicity provided
servers are benign and trustworthy. It is a centralized pro-
tocol where one server acts as a coordinator and the others
act as cohorts. To terminate a transaction, the coordinator
collects commit or abort votes from all cohorts, and decides
to commit the transaction only if all the cohorts choose to
commit, and otherwise decides to abort. The decision is then
asynchronously sent to the client and the cohorts. 2PC is
sufficient to ensure atomicity if servers are trustworthy; but
in untrusted environments, 2PC is inadequate as a cohort or
the coordinator may maliciously lie about the decision. We
need to develop an atomic commitment protocol that can
overcome such malicious behaviour.
To make 2PC trust-free, we combine 2PC with a multi-
signature scheme, Collective Signing or CoSi (Section 2.2): a
two-round protocol where a set of processes collectively sign
a given record using their private keys and random secrets.
CoSi guarantees that a record (or in our case block) pro-
duced by a leader (or coordinator) is validated and signed
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Figure 7: Different phases and block generation progress made in each phase of TFCommit
by all the witnesses (or cohorts) and that if any of the in-
volved processes lied in any of the phases, the resulting sig-
nature will be incorrect. A signature is bound to a single
record; any process with the public keys of all the processes
can verify whether the signature is valid and corresponds to
that record.
We propose a novel approach of integrating 2PC with CoSi
to achieve the atomicity properties of 2PC and the verifiable
properties of CoSi. The basic idea is that the coordinator,
similar to 2PC, collects commit or abort votes from the co-
horts, forms a decision, and encapsulates the transaction
details including the decision in a block. The coordinator
then sends the block to be verified and collectively signed
by the cohorts. An incorrect block (either with inaccurate
transaction details or wrong decision) produced by a ma-
licious coordinator will not be accepted by correct servers,
thus resulting in an invalid signature that can be easily ver-
ified by an auditor.
A successful round of TFCommit produces a block to be
appended to the log in a consistent order by all servers.
For ease of exposition, this section presents TFCommit with
two main assumptions: (i) the transactions are committed
sequentially to avoid forks in the log; and (ii) all servers par-
ticipate in transaction termination – even the servers that
did not partake in transaction execution – to have identi-
cal block order in their logs. In Section 4.6 we relax these
assumptions and discuss various techniques to scale TFCom-
mit.
Recall from Table 1 all the details stored in each block.
Once a block is cosigned and logged by all servers, it is im-
mutable; hence, all the details must be filled in during dif-
ferent phases of TFCommit. However, to ensure atomicity
and verifiability of TFCommit, we only need the transaction
id, its decision, and the co-sign. Other details such as the
Read and Write sets, Merkle Tree roots, and hashes are nec-
essary to detect other failures including isolation violation
and data corruption.
The protocol:
A client, A, upon finishing transaction execution, sends a
signed µ =
〈
end transaction(Tid, tsi, R set-Wset)
〉
σA re-
quest to the coordinator, where Tid is a unique transaction id
and tsi is a client-assigned commit timestamp of the trans-
action. The request also includes R set-Wset: the read and
write sets consisting of data item ids, values read and new
values written, rts, and wts. The servers ignore any end
transaction request with a timestamp lower than the latest
committed timestamp.
TFCommit is a 3-round protocol involving 5 phases of
communication as shown in Figure 7. Since TFCommit
merges 2PC with CoSi, we indicate each phase by a mapping
of <2PC phase, CoSi phase>. Figure 7 shows the phases as
well as the progress made in constructing the block at each
phase. The phases of TFCommit are:
1) <GetVote, SchAnnouncement>: Upon receiv-
ing the µ =
〈
end transaction(Ti, tsi, R set-Wset)
〉
σA
request from the client, to commit transaction Ti, the
coordinator C prepares a partially filled block, bi =
[tsi, Rset - Wset, hi−1], containing the commit timestamp,
read and write sets, and hash of the previous block. C
then encapsulates the signed client request µ and sends the〈
get vote(bi, µ)
〉
σC
message to all the cohorts.
2) <Vote, SchCommitment>: Every cohort H veri-
fies both the get vote message and the encapsulated client
request, and computes the Schnorr-commitment (xsch) for
CoSi. Then, only the cohorts that are part of the transac-
tion, perform the following actions. A cohort involved in the
transaction locally decides whether to commit or abort the
transaction. If the cohort locally decides to commit, then it
constructs a Merkle Hash Tree (MHT) (Section 2.3) of its
shard with all the data items as leaves of the MHT and with
the root node rootmht. The MHT reflects all the updates
in Ti assuming that Ti be committed; since MHT compu-
tation is done in memory, the datastore is unaffected if Ti
eventually aborts. (The MHT root is required for datastore
authentication, as explained in Section 4.2.2.) The involved
cohorts then send
〈
vote(decision, rootmht, xsch)
〉
σH whereas
the cohorts not part of the transaction send
〈
vote(xsch)
〉
σH
to the coordinator. As the coordinator is also involved in
co-signing, it produces the appropriate vote message.
3) <null, SchChallenge>: In this phase, the coor-
dinator C collects all the cohort responses and checks if
any cohort (or itself) involved in the transaction decided
to abort. If none, it chooses commit, otherwise abort.
It then aggregates all the MHT roots of the involved co-
horts (roots =
∑
rootmht), and fills the roots field in the
block bi along with the decision field. If any involved co-
horts chose abort, the respective roots will be missing in
the block. Finally, the coordinator aggregates the Schnorr-
commitments Xsch =
∑
xsch from all the servers and com-
putes the Schnorr-challenge by concatenating and hashing
Xsch with bi i.e., ch = h(Xsch||bi). The coordinator then
sends
〈
challenge(ch,Xsch, bi)
〉
σC
to all cohorts.
4) <null, SchResponse>: In this phase, every cohort,
H, checks if the decision within the block bi is abort, and if
so, bi should have some missing roots; if the decision is com-
mit, bi should have all the roots from the involved servers.
Every involved cohort that sent the MHT root in the vote
phase verifies if its corresponding root in the block is the
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same as the one it sent. Cohorts also verify whether a po-
tentially malicious coordinator computed the challenge, ch,
correctly by hashing the concatenated Xsch and bi, both of
which were sent in the challenge message. A cohort then
computes the Schnorr-response ri using its secret key and
the challenge ch, and sends
〈
response(ri)
〉
σH to the coordi-
nator.
5) <Decision, null>: The coordinator collects all the
Schnorr-responses and aggregates them, Rsch =
∑
rsch, to
form the collective signature represented by 〈ch,Rsch〉. In-
tuitively, the challenge ch is computed using the block; and
the Schnorr-response Rsch requires the private keys of the
servers, thus the signature binds the block with the public
keys of the servers. The coordinator then updates the co-
sign field in the block and sends the finalized block to the
client and the cohorts. If the decision is commit, all servers
append block bi to their log and update their respective
datastores.
The client, with the public keys of all the servers, verifies
the co-sign before accepting the decision – even an aborted
transaction must be signed by all the servers. If the verifi-
cation fails, the client detects an anomaly and triggers an
audit, which may halt the progress in the system.
TFCommit, similar to 2PC, can be blocking if either the
coordinator or any cohort fails (crash or malicious). TF-
Commit can be made non-blocking by adding another phase
that makes the chosen value available, as in the case of Three
Phase Commit [39]; we leave this extension for future work.
4.3.2 Detecting Malicious Behavior
A correct execution of TFCommit ensures serializable
transaction isolation, atomicity, and verifiable commitment.
However, a malicious server can (i) violate the isolation
guarantees by committing non-serializable transactions; (ii)
a malicious coordinator can break atomicity by convincing
some servers to commit a transactions and others to abort;
or (iii) a server can send wrong cryptographic values during
co-signing to violate verifiability.
Lemma 3 : The auditor detects serializablity violation.
Proof : Transaction execution is based on executing read
and write operations in the timestamp order. The transac-
tions are ordered based on the timestamps, which are mono-
tonically increasing. If a transaction has done a conflicting
access inconsistent with the timestamp order, it leads to
one of the following conflicts: 1) RW-conflict: a transaction
with a smaller timestamp read a data-item with a larger
timestamp; 2) WW-conflict: a transaction with a smaller
timestamp wrote a data-item that was already updated with
a larger timestamp; 3) WR-conflict: a transaction with a
smaller timestamp wrote a data-item after it was read by a
transaction with a larger timestamp. For each transaction
audited, the auditor verifies if any of the above violations
exist, and if so, the auditor detects the server responsible
for the violation to be misbehaving. This is equivalent to
verifying that no cycle exists in the Serialization Graph of
the transactions being audited. 2
Lemma 4 : The auditor or a correct server detects incorrect
cryptographic values for CoSi sent by a malicious server –
which hampers verifiablity of TFCommit.
Proof : If any server sends an incorrect cryptographic
value used for co-signing, this results in an invalid signa-
Figure 8: Atomicity violation of TFCommit
ture, and the original work CoSi [40] guarantees identifying
the precise server that computed the crytographic values
incorrectly. Since TFCommit incorporates CoSi, it inher-
its this guarantee from CoSi. Intuitively, in the schResponse
phase, the coordinator can identify if the signature is invalid,
in which case, it can check partial signatures produced by
excluding one server at time and detect the precise server
without which the signature is valid. The coordinator is
incentivised to perform this rigorous check because if the
signature is invalid, the auditor suspects the coordinator
for producing an incorrect block. We refer to the original
work [40] that discusses the proof in depth. 2
Lemma 5 : The auditor or a correct server detect atomicity
violation of TFCommit.
Proof : Recall that the coordinator C collects votes in
phase two of TFCommit, forms the decision, and sends the
partial block containing the decision in the challenge mes-
sage. Consider Figure 8 where a malicious coordinator sends
block bc with commit decision to group Gc and block ba with
abort decision to group Ga. More precisely, the coordinator
sends
〈
challenge(ch,Xsch, bc)
〉
σC
to Gc (Xsch is the aggre-
gated Schnorr-commits) and
〈
challenge(ch,Xsch, ba)
〉
σC
to
Ga. Since the decision is part of the block, the two blocks bc
and ba have to be different if the coordinator violates atom-
icity. But with respect to the challenge ch, there are two
possibilities, both producing invalid signatures:
• Case 1 : Coordinator sends the same challenge ch com-
puted using block bc (or ba) to both groups.
Any correct server in the group Ga will recompute the
challenge using the block it received, ba, and immediately
recognize that the challenge sent by the coordinator does not
correspond to the block ba. (Alternatively, if the coordinator
used ba to compute the challenge ch, then servers in Gc
will detect the anomaly.) Even if the servers in one group,
say Ga, collude with the coordinator and do not expose the
anomaly, the challenge ch corresponds only to block bc. The
auditor, while auditing a server in group Ga, detects that
the co-sign in block ba is invalid as it does not correspond
to that block.
• Case 2 : Coordinator sends the challenge ch computed
using block bc to group Gc and the challenge ch
′ computed
using block ba to group Ga.
In the final step of TFCommit, the servers in group Gc
will use ch to compute the Schnorr-response, whereas the
servers in group Ga will use ch
′ to compute the Schnorr-
response. Given that the final collective signature can be
tied only to a single block, the co-sign does not correspond
to either bc or ba, hence producing a wrong signature. 2
The coordinator or a cohort can never force all servers
to commit if at least one server decides to abort a transac-
tion. For committed transaction, the transaction block must
contain MHT roots from all the involved servers; for aborted
transactions, the block should have at least one MHT root
missing. Assume a server Sb chooses abort and hence, does
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not send its MHT root. If the coordinator produces a fake
root for server Sb, the server will detect it in the schResponse
phase. And in case server Sb colludes with the coordinator
by either not exposing the fake root or by producing a fake
root itself, the datastore verification (discussed in Section
4.2.2), which uses MHT roots, will fail for server Sb. An in-
volved server (coordinator or cohort) can only force an abort
on all servers by choosing to abort the transaction, which is
tolerable as the decision will be consistent across all servers
and will not violate the atomicity of TFCommit.
4.4 Transaction Logging
The transaction log in Fides is a tamper-proof, globally
replicated log. When a transaction commits after a suc-
cessful round of TFCommit, all servers append the newly
produced block to their logs.
Detecting Malicious Behavior: One or more faulty
servers can collude (but not all at once) to (i) tamper an
arbitrary block, (ii) reorder the blocks, or (iii) omit the tail
of the log (last few blocks). The auditor collects logs from all
the servers and uses the collective signature stored in each
block to detect an incorrect log.
Lemma 6 : Given a set of logs collected from all servers,
the auditor detects all incorrect logs – logs with arbitrary
blocks that are modified or logs with reordered blocks.
Proof : The collective signature in each block prevents
a malicious server from manipulating that block once it is
appended to the log. The signature is tied specifically to one
block and if the contents of the block are manipulated, the
signature verification will fail. One or more malicious servers
cannot tamper with an arbitrary block successfully without
the cooperation of all the servers. And since the hash of the
previous block is part of a log entry, unless all the servers
collude, the blocks cannot be successfully re-ordered. 2
Lemma 7 : Given a set of logs collected from all servers,
the auditor detects all incomplete logs – logs with missing
tail entries.
Proof : A subset of servers cannot successfully modify ar-
bitrary blocks in the log (proof in Lemma 6) but they can
omit the tail of the log. During an audit, the auditor gathers
the logs from all the servers. At least one correct server ex-
ists with the complete log – which can easily be verified for
correctness by validating the collective signature and hash
pointer in each block. The auditor uses this complete and
verified log to detect that one or more servers store an in-
complete log. 2
4.5 Correctness of Fides
Definition 1: Verifiable ACID properties
In transaction processing, ACID refers to the four key
components of a transaction:
i) Atomicity: A transaction is an atomic unit in that either
all operations are executed or none.
ii) Consistency: Data is in a consistent state before and after
a transaction executes.
iii) Isolaiton: When transactions are executed concurrently,
isolation ensures that the transactions seem to have executed
sequentially.
iv) Durability: If a transaction commits, its updates are
persistent even in the presence of failures.
We define v-ACID as the ACID properties that can be
verified. v-ACID indicates that a database system provides
verifiable evidence that the ACID guarantees are upheld.
This definition is useful when individual database servers
are untrusted and may violate ACID – in which case the
system must allow verifying and detecting the violations.
Theorem 1: Fides provides Verifiable ACID guarantees.
Proof : Fides guarantees that an external auditor can verify
if the database servers provide ACID guarantees or not.
The first step in the verification is for the auditor to obtain
a correct and complete log. Given the assumption that at
least one server is correct at a given time, Lemmas 6 and 7
prove that during an audit, the auditor always identifies the
correct and complete log.
Lemma 5 proves that Atomicity violation is verifi-
able; Lemma 2 proves that the auditor verifies if the ef-
fect of a transaction resulted in an inconsistent database
when a server buffers inconsistent writes, i.e., verifiable
Consistency ; Lemma 3 proves that the Isolation guarantee
which ensures serializable transaction execution is verifiable;
and finally, Lemmas 1 and 2 verify if the effects of committed
transactions are Durable. Hence, an auditor verifies whether
the servers in Fides uphold ACID properties.
Note that multiple ACID violations can exist in the trans-
action execution. Since the log is sequential, the auditor
identifies the first occurrence of any of these violations and
the blocks after that need not be audited since everything
following that violation can be incorrect and hence irrelevant
to a correct execution. 2
4.6 Scaling TFCommit protocol
The TFCommit protocol discussed in Section 4.3 makes
simplifying assumptions that each block contains a single
transaction and a globally designated coordinator termi-
nates all transactions which requires participation fromm
all servers. This makes TFCommit expensive as any server
not involved in a transaction must also participate in its ter-
mination. In this section we provide an intuitive overview
of how to scale TFCommit.
To scale TFCommit, two aspects can be enhanced: (i)
Allow multiple transactions to commit simultaneously by
storing multiple transactions in a block, and (ii) Reduce the
number of servers participating in transaction termination
to only the servers involved in that transaction.
Extending each block to contain multiple transactions is
straight-forward. The coordinator collects and inserts a set
of non-conflicting client generated transactions and orders
them within a single block at the start of TFCommit. Once
the protocol begins, the coordinator or any other server can-
not re-order the transactions within the block (the argument
is similar to Lemma 4). This technique allows each execu-
tion of TFCommit to commit multiple transactions. In our
evaluations in Section 6, we store multiple transactions in
each block.
To reduce the number of servers participating in trans-
action termination, servers are divided into small dynamic
groups. The servers accessed by a transaction forms one
group, in which one server acts as the coordinator to ter-
minate that transaction (instead of one globally designated
coordinator). Each group executes TFCommit internally
and upon a successful execution, the coordinators of each
group publish the block to all other groups. The problem
with such a solution is in deciding the order of blocks across
groups such that all the servers maintain a consistently or-
dered transaction log.
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Figure 9: Scaling TFCommit.
There are multiple ways to solve the ordering problem.
Figure 9 depicts a scalable solution that abstracts the or-
dering of blocks as a service (OrdServ). The figure shows
two groups of servers Gi and Gj , each accessed by trans-
actions Ti and Tj respectively. The OrdServ component is
responsible for atomically broadcasting a single stream of
blocks, each generated by TFCommit executed in different
groups of servers. OrdServ can use a byzantine consensus
protocol such as PBFT [9] among the coordinators to consis-
tently order blocks; or it can be an off-the-shelf application
such as Apache Kafka, used to provide ordering service in
a recent work, Veritas [5]. OrdServ is also responsible for
chaining the blocks i.e., the coordinators of the groups do
not fill in the hash of previous block, rather it is filled by
the OrdServ. There are two possible scenarios regarding the
groups:
• Gi ∩ Gj = ∅: If any two groups of servers have no
overlapping server, there is no dependency between the two
blocks of transactions Ti and Tj , and OrdServ can order
them in any way and broadcast a consistent order.
• Gi ∩ Gj 6= ∅: If any two groups have a non-empty
intersection, then transactions Ti and Tj may have a depen-
dency order (e.g., Tj wrote a data item after Ti read it); the
OrdServ should ensure that the transaction log reflects this
dependency between the published blocks.
Although there is flexibility in choosing OrdServ, it is im-
portant to choose a solution that maintains local transaction
order (within a group) across the globally replicated log. So-
lutions such a ParBlock [6] track the transaction dependency
order and maintains that order while publishing blocks. We
plan to integrate ParBlock with TFCommit as future work.
5. FAILURE EXAMPLES
In this section we discuss various malicious failures and
safety violation scenarios and explain how the failures are
detected. The failure model of Fides permits a server to
misbehave but captures enough details in the transaction
log for an auditor to detect the malicious failures as well as
the failing servers.
Scenario 1: Incorrect Reads
A malicious server can respond with incorrect values for
the data items read in the read requests. We use Lemma 1
to detect this.
Figure 10: Isolation guarantee violation example.
Figure 11: Data corruption example
Figure 10 gives an example of incorrect reads. Assume
that the severs store bank details and there are two trans-
actions T1 and T2 deducting $100 from two accounts, x and
y. Block-10 contains T1 and Block-11 contains T2. T1 reads
two data items: one with id x, value 1000, rts = ts-92, and
wts = ts-88, and the second with id y, value 500, rts = ts-
48, and wts = ts-48. T1 updates x to $900 and y to $400,
and upon commitment, it also updates their rts and wts to
ts-100. Any transaction executing after this must reflect the
latest data. But T2, committing at timestamp ts-115, has
incorrect value of $1000 for x (but up-to-date timestamps).
This indicates that the server storing data items x is misbe-
having by sending incorrect read values.
Scenario 2: Incorrect Block Creation
While executing TFCommit to terminate a transaction Ti,
a malicious coordinator can add an incorrect Merkle Hash
Tree (MHT) root of a benign server Sb in the block; this can
cause audit failure of Sb (as Lemma 2 uses MHT roots to
detect datastore corruption). But such an attempt will be
detected by the benign server, as proved in Lemma 5.
In the vote phase of TFCommit, explained in Section 4.3,
server Sb sends the MHT root corresponding to transaction
Ti to the coordinator. If the coordinator stores an incorrect
MHT root or a correct root but corresponding to an older
transaction Ti−1, Sb can detect this in the schResponse
phase of TFCommit. and not cooperate to produce a valid
co-sign.
Scenario 3: Data corruption
A server may corrupt the data stored in the datastore,
essentially not reflecting the expected changes requested by
the clients. We assume a multi-versioned datastore in this
example and use Verification Objects VO and MHT roots
to detect datastore corruption, as proved in Lemma 2. Con-
sider a transaction Ti committed at timestamp ts-100 and
updated a data item x stored in Sm. Figure 11 indicates
the data stored in server Sm that is being audited at version
ts-100. The auditor fetches the corresponding block (block
10) from the log and extracts x’s value written by Ti and
the MHT root corresponding to Sm. This MHT root should
reflect x’s updated value.
Assume Sm was malicious and did not update x to 900.
In the next step of verification, auditor asks Sm for the
VO of data item x at timestamp ts-100. Sm responds with
{h2, h6, hroot} (hash values of the sibling nodes of data x in
the path from leaf to root). Auditor hashes x’s value stored
in the block (H(900)) and uses h2 sent in VO to compute
h′5 and further, hash h
′
5 and h6 (from VO) to compute the
expected root, h′root. This computed root should match the
root the root stored in the block i.e., h′root = rootSm−ts100.
But since Sm did not update the value of x to 900, the
root computed by the auditor will not not match the root
stored in the block (assuming collision-free hash functions).
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Thus data corruption at Sm, precisely at version ts-100 is
detected.
6. EVALUATION
In this section, we discuss the experimental evaluation of
TFCommit. Our goal is to measure the overhead incurred
in executing an atomic commit protocol on untrusted in-
frastructure. The focus of Fides and TFCommit is fault
detection in a non-replicated system, hence solutions based
on replication that typically use PBFT [9] are orthogonal to
TFCommit.
In evaluating TFCommit, we measure the performance us-
ing two aspects: commit latency - time taken to terminate
a transaction once the client sends end transaction request,
and throughput - the number of transactions committed per
second; TFCommit was implemented in Python. We de-
ployed multiple database servers on a single Amazon AWS
datacenter (US-West-2 region) where each server was an EC2
m5.xlarge vm consisting of 4 vCPUs, 16 GiB RAM and upto
10 Gbps network bandwidth. Unless otherwise specified in
the experiment, each database server stores a single shard
(or partition) of data consisting of 10000 data items.
To evaluate the protocol, we used Transactional-YCSB-
like benchmark [10] consisting of transactions with read-
write operations. Each transaction consisted of 5 opera-
tions on different data items thus generating a multi-record
workload. The data items were picked at random from a
pool of all the data partitions combined, resulting in dis-
tributed transactions. Although we presented TFCommit
and Fides with the simplifying assumption of one transac-
tion per block, in the experiments, we typically stored 100
non-conflicting transactions in each block. Every experi-
mental run consisted of 1000 client requests and each data
point plotted in this section is an average of 3 runs.
6.1 TFCommit vs. 2PC
As a first step, we compare the trust-free protocol TF-
Commit with its trusted counterpart Two Phase Com-
mit [17]. TFCommit is essentially 2PC combined with
the cryptographic primitives (Co-Signing and Merkle Hash
Trees) which results in an additional phase due to the trust-
free nature. Thus, comparing TFCommit with 2PC high-
lights the overhead incurred by TFCommit to operate in
an untrusted setting. Both 2PC and TFCommit are imple-
mented such that transactions are terminated and blocks are
produced sequentially so that the log does not have forks.
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Figure 12: 2PC vs. TFCommit (TFC).
Figure 12 contrasts the performance of 2PC vs. TFCom-
mit. We increase the number of servers and measure com-
mit latency and throughput. In this experiment, each block
stores a single transaction so that we can measure the over-
head induced by TFCommit per transaction. Given that
each block contains a single transaction and that blocks are
generated sequentially, the servers are essentially commit-
ting one transaction after another.
As indicated in the figure, the average latency to com-
mit a single transaction in an untrusted setting is approxi-
mately 1.8x more than a trusted environment. The through-
put for 2PC is approximately 2.1x higher than TFCom-
mit. TFCommit performs additional computations com-
pared with 2PC: Merkle Hash Tree (MHT) updates to com-
pute new roots after each transaction, collective signature
on each block, and an additional phase. In spite of the
additional computing and achieving trust-free atomic com-
mitment, TFCommit is only 1.8x slower than 2PC. Having
shown the overhead of TFCommit as compared to 2PC, the
following experiments measure the performance of TFCom-
mit by varying different parameters.
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Figure 13: Varying number of transaction per block
In this experiment, we fix the number of servers to 5 and
increase the load on the system by increasing the number of
transactions stored within each block. Each database server
consisted of 10000 data items. Figure 13 indicates the aver-
age latency to commit a single transaction and the through-
put while increasing number of transactions stored within
each block from 2 to 120. The latency to commit a single
transaction reduces by 2.6x and the throughput increases
by 2.5x when 80 or more transactions are batched in a sin-
gle block. This experiment highlights that even though the
blocks are produced sequentially, the performance of TF-
Commit can be significantly enhanced by processing multi-
ple transactions in one block.
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In this experiment, we measure the scalability of TFCom-
mit by increasing the number of database servers (each stor-
ing a shard of 10000 data items) from 3 to 9, while keep-
ing the number of transaction per block constant (100 per
block). Figure 14 depicts the experimental results. The
throughput of TFCommit increases by 47% and the commit
latency reduces by 33% when the number of servers are in-
creased from 3 to 9. Figure 14 also shows the most expensive
operation in committing transactions i.e., Merkle Hash Tree
(MHT) updates. Recall from Section 4.3 that in TFCom-
mit, termination of each transaction requires computing the
updated MHT root. Given that each block has 100 transac-
tions, which in turn consists of 5 operations each, there are
500 operations in each block. With only 3 servers, all the
operations access the three shards whereas with 9 servers,
the 500 operations are spread across nine shards. Thus, the
load per server reduces when there are more servers, result-
ing in the reduction of MHT update latencies. This exper-
iment highlights that TFCommit is scalable and performs
well with increasing number of database servers.
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Figure 15: Varying number of data items per shard
In the final set of experiments, we measure the perfor-
mance of TFCommit by varying the number of data items
stored in each database server, while keeping a constant of
100 transactions per block and using 5 database servers. The
number of items stored in each server increased from 1000
to 10000 to measure the commit latency and throughput of
TFCommit, as shown in Figure 15. The commit latency
increases by 15% and the throughput reduces by 14% with
the increase in number of data items per shard. The perfor-
mance fluctuation is due to the Merkle Hash Tree updates
that varies with the number of data items. Updating a sin-
gle leaf node in a binary hash tree with 1000 leaf nodes (data
items) updates 10 nodes (from leaf to the root) and a tree
with 10000 leaf nodes updates roughly 14 nodes. Thus, the
performance of TFCommit decreases with increasing num-
ber of data items stored within each server.
7. RELATEDWORK
The literature on databases that tolerate malicious fail-
ures is extensive [15, 16, 41, 14, 26, 36]. All of these solutions
differ from Fides as they: assume a singe non-partitioned
database, rely on replicating the database to tolerate byzan-
tine failures, and some also require a trusted component for
correctness. Garcia-Molina et al.[15] were the earliest to
propose a set of database schemes that tolerate malicious
faults. The work presents the theoretical foundations on
replicating the database on enough servers to handle mali-
cious faults but lacks a practical implementation. Gashi et
al. [16] discuss fault-tolerance other than just crash failures
and provide a report composed of database failures caused
by software bugs. HRDB by Vandiver et al. [41] propose
a replication scheme to handle byzantine faults wherein a
trusted coordinator delegates transactions to the replicas.
The coordinator also orders the transactions and decides
when to safely commit a transaction. Byzantium by Gar-
cia et al. [14] provides an efficient replicated middleware
between the client and the database to tolerate byzantine
faults. It differs from previous solutions by allowing concur-
rent transactions and by not requiring a trusted component
to coordinate the replicas.
The advent of blockchains brought with it a set of
technologies that manage data in untrusted environments.
In both the open perimissionless and closed permissioned
blockchains, due to lack of trust, the underlying protocols
must be designed to tolerate any type of malicious behav-
ior. But these protocols and their applications are mostly
limited to crypto-currencies and cannot be easily extended
for large scale distributed data management. Although per-
missionless blockchain solutions such as Elastico [27] Om-
niledger [21], and RapidChain [45] discuss sharding, it is
with respect to transactions, i.e., different servers execute
different transactions to enhance performance but all of
them maintain copies of same data, essentially acting as
replicas of a single database. These solutions differ from
Fides as they focus of replicated data rather than distributed
data.
In the space of transaction commitment, proposals such
as [31, 47, 4, 46] tolerate malicious faults. Mohan et al. [31]
integrated 2PC with byzantine fault-tolerance to make 2PC
non-blocking and to prevent the coordinator from send-
ing conflicting decisions. Zhao et al.[47] propose a com-
mit protocol that tolerates byzantine faults at the coordi-
nator by replicating it on enough servers to run a byzan-
tine agreement protocol to agree on the transaction decision.
Chainspace [4] proposes a commit protocol in a blockchain
setting wherein each shard is replicated on multiple servers
to allow executing byzantine agreement per shard to agree
on the transaction decision. All these solutions require repli-
cation and execute byzantine agreement on the replicas,
and hence differ from TFCommit. TFCommit uses Col-
lective Signing (CoSi) [40], a cryptographic multisignature
scheme to tolerate malicious failures during commitment.
CoSi has been adapted to make consensus more efficient in
blockchains, e.g., ByzCoin [20]. To our knowledge, TFCom-
mit is the first to merge CoSi with atomic commitment.
Fides uses a tamper-proof log to audit the system and de-
tect any failures across database servers; this technique has
been studied for decades in distributed systems [42, 43, 44,
18]. In [42] and [43], Yumerefendi et al. highlight the use
of accountability – a mechanism to detect and expose mis-
behaving servers– as a general distributed systems design.
They implement CATS [44] an accountable network storage
system that uses secure message logs to detect and expose
misbehaving nodes. PeerReview [18] generalizes this idea by
building a practical accountable system that uses tamper-
evident logs to detect and irrefutably identify the faulty
nodes. More recent solutions such as BlockchainDB [12],
BigchainDB [28], Veritas [5] and [13] use blockchain as a
tamper-proof log to store transactions across fully or par-
12
tially replicated databases. CloudBFT [34], on the other
hand, tolerates malicious faults in the cloud by relying on
tamper-proof hardware to order the requests in a trusted
way.
The datastore authentication technique that uses Merkle
Hash Trees (MHT) and Verification Objects was first pro-
posed by Merkle [29]. The technique employed in Fides that
enables verifing the datastore per transaction is inspired by
the work of Jain et al. [19]. Their solution assumes a sin-
gle outsourced database, and more importantly, it requires a
central trusted site to store the MHT roots of the outsourced
data and the transaction history. Fides replaces the trusted
entity by a globally replicated log that stores the necessary
information for authentication. Many works have looked at
query correctness, freshness, and data provenance for static
data but only few solutions such as [25] and [33] (apart from
[19] discussed above) consider data updates. [25] and [33]
discuss alternate data authentication techniques but also as-
sume a single outsourced database.
8. CONCLUSION
Traditional data management systems typically consider
crash failures only. With the increasing usage of the cloud,
crowdsourcing, and the rise of blockchain, the need to store
data on untrusted servers has risen. The typical approach
for achieving fault-tolerance, in general, uses replication.
However, given the strict bounds on consensus in malicious
settings, alternative approaches need to be explored. In this
paper, we propose Fides, an auditable data management
system designed for infrastructures that are not trusted.
Instead of using replication for fault-tolerance, Fides uses
fault-detection to discourage malicious behavior. An inte-
gral component of any distributed data management system
is the commit protocol. We propose TFCommit, a novel dis-
tributed atomic commitment protocol that executes trans-
actions on untrusted servers. Since every server in Fides is
untrusted, Fides replaces traditional transaction logs with a
tamper-proof log similar to blockchain. The tamper-proof
log stores all the necessary information required to audit the
system and detect any failures. We discuss each component
of Fides i.e., the different layers of a typical DBMS compris-
ing of a transaction execution layer, a transaction commit-
ment layer, and a datastore. For each layer, both correct
execution and failure detection techniques are discussed. To
highlight the practicality of TFCommit, we implement and
evaluate TFCommit. The experiments emphasize the per-
formance and scalability aspects of TFCommit.
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